Abstract-In this work, we study indistinguishability obfuscation and functional encryption for general circuits:
I. INTRODUCTION
In this work we study two long-standing open feasibility questions in cryptography: secure program obfuscation, and functional encryption.
Obfuscation. Roughly speaking, program obfuscation aims to make a computer program "unintelligible" while preserving its functionality. The formal study of program obfuscation was initiated by Barak, Goldreich, Impagliazzo, Rudich, Sahai, Vadhan, and Yang [1] , [2] . Unfortunately, they showed that the most natural simulation-based formulation of program obfuscation (a.k.a. "black-box obfuscation") is impossible to achieve for general programs, in a very strong sense: They showed that there exist unobfuscatable functions -a family of functions {f s } such that given any circuit that implements f s , an efficient procedure can extract the secret s; however, any efficient adversary given only black-box access to f s cannot guess even a single bit of s with non-negligible advantage. Indeed, such unobfuscatable function families exist with very low circuit complexity (i.e. in TC 0 under widely believed intractability assumptions), so one cannot hope for general purpose obfuscators achieving a natural simulation-based definition of obfuscation even for very low complexity classes.
Faced with this impossibility result, Barak et al. [1] , [2] suggested another notion of program obfuscation called indistinguishability obfuscation: An indistinguishability obfuscator iO for a class of circuits C guarantees that given two equivalent circuits C 1 and C 2 from the class, the two distribution of obfuscations iO(C 1 ) and iO(C 2 ) should be computationally indistinguishable. We note that if the circuit class C has efficiently computable canonical forms, then the computation of that canonical form would already be an indistinguishability obfuscator [2] , [3] . Since their introduction in 2001 , it has been an open problem to construct indistinguishability obfuscators for any natural circuit class that is not known to admit efficiently computable canonical forms. In particular, the central open question regarding indistinguishability obfuscation has been:
Do there exist indistinguishability obfuscators for all polynomial-size circuits?
It is important to note that unlike simulation-based definitions of obfuscation, it is not immediately clear how useful indistinguishability obfuscators would be. Perhaps the strongest philosophical justification for indistinguishability obfuscators comes from the work of Goldwasser and Rothblum [3] , who showed that (efficiently computable) indistinguishability obfuscators achieve the notion of BestPossible Obfuscation [3] : Informally, a best-possible obfuscator guarantees that its output hides as much about the input circuit as any circuit of a certain size.
Nevertheless, very few applications of indistinguishability obfuscators were described in the literature, in fact the only application that we are aware of is to removing software watermarks [2] . The main contributions of this work are to (1) construct indistinguishability obfuscators for all circuits, and (2) show how to use indistinguishability obfuscators to solve the central open problem in the area of Functional Encryption.
Functional Encryption. In Functional Encryption, ciphertexts encrypt inputs x and keys are issued for strings y. The striking feature of this system is that using the key SK y to decrypt a ciphertext CT x = Enc(x), yields the value F (x, y) but does not reveal anything else about x. Furthermore, any arbitrary collusion of key holders relative to many strings y i does not yield any more information about x beyond what is "naturally revealed" by the functionality (i.e. F (x, y i ) for all i).
Functional Encryption started with the notion of attributebased encryption (ABE) [4] , [5] and evolved over time [6] , [7] . The term functional encryption first appeared in [8] , and formal definitions and constructions were subsequently given in [9] , [10] . Earlier influences include Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) [11] , [12] , [13] and searching on encrypted data [14] , [15] .
The general notion of functional encryption subsumes the notion of ABE: In ABE, encrypted messages consist of a secret payload m and a public attribute string x, where the secret key SK y permits the recovery of the payload m if and only if F (x, y) = 1. While both ABE and FE require full collusion resilience, the critical difference between ABE and general FE is that ABE does not ensure the secrecy of the attribute string x. Recent breakthrough works [16] , [17] , [18] show how to achieve ABE for arbitrary circuits F , however these constructions do not provide any secrecy for the x input.
In contrast to ABE, existing FE schemes prior to our work are much more limited in power, with the state of the art roughly limited to the inner-product construction of Katz et al. [7] and its adaptation to lattice-based cryptography by Agrawal et al. [19] . In these systems ciphertexts and keys are associated with vectors x, y, and on decryption we only learn if the dot product x · y is zero. While there are interesting applications of this basic functionality, it is a far cry from the goal of realizing functional encryption for general functions, or even a large general class of circuits. There are also constructions that achieve only limitedcollusion notions of security (and also several impossibility results for strong simulation-based security notions). We discuss these in Section X below. The central open question regarding functional encryption has been: Does there exist a functional encryption scheme supporting all polynomial-size circuits?
II. OUR RESULTS Our first result is a candidate construction of an indistinguishability obfuscator iO for all polynomial-size, log-depth circuits (i.e. NC 1 ). The security of our construction relies on a new algebraic hardness assumption. We provide evidence for the plausibility of our assumption by proving it to be true in a specific generic model that seems to capture most "natural attacks" on this type of construction.
Our construction and assumption are staged in a framework that we call Multilinear Jigsaw Puzzles. Multilinear Jigsaw Puzzles are a simplified variant of multilinear maps, in which only the party who generated the system parameters can "encode elements in the exponent" of the different groups. These Multilinear Jigsaw Puzzles can be constructed by eliminating some components from the GGH (asymmetric) "approximate multilinear maps" [20] . Most notably, we eliminate the elements of the GGH setup that give rise to the most potent cryptanalytic attacks, including the "weak discrete log" attack [20] . We can also instantiate Multilinear Jigsaw Puzzles by eliminating some parts from the recent work of [21] over the integers.
After constructing indistinguishability obfuscators for NC 1 from Multilinear Jigsaw Puzzles, we use these indistinguishability obfuscators in a black-box manner to obtain the following results:
• Using indistinguishability obfuscator for NC 1 together with any (leveled) fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme with decryption in NC 1 (e.g. [22] , [23] , [24] , [25] , [26] ), we show how to obtain an indistinguishability obfuscator for all polynomial-size circuits. The essential new idea here is to use a "twokey" encryption technique, similar in spirit to NaorYung [27] .
• Using indistinguishability obfuscator for polynomialsize circuits, together with injective one-way functions, public-key encryption, and a novel variant of Sahai's simulation-sound non-interactive zero knowledge [28] proofs, we show how to obtain functional encryption schemes supporting all polynomial-size circuits. Our construction achieves selective indistinguishability security, which can be amplified to full indistinguishability security using complexity leveraging. Finally, using the recent transformation of De Caro et al [29] one can obtain meaningful simulation-based security for functional encryption for all circuits. Our construction furthermore achieves succinct ciphertexts: The size of the ciphertexts in our scheme does not depend on potential secret key circuit sizes or even depth (nor do they depend on any parameter sizes needed for Multilinear Jigsaw Puzzles). We emphasize that these results use our indistinguishability obfuscator for NC 1 as a black box, and do not need to make further use of Multilinear Jigsaw Puzzles. We are able to obtain these results through a novel use of indistinguishability obfuscators, by making an intuitive connection between the use of indistinguishability obfuscation and witness indistinguishable proofs. (More on this below.)
III. MULTILINEAR JIGSAW PUZZLES
For our construction we use a variant of multilinear maps that offers only a strict subset of the functionality, and we term this variant Multilinear Jigsaw Puzzles. These are similar to (the asymmetric version of) the GGH multilinear encoding schemes [20] , except that in our setting only the party that generated the system parameters is able to encode elements. Below is an intuitive description of Multilinear Jigsaw Puzzles using multiplicative notation for groups, a more formal treatment can be found in the full-version [30] . Roughly speaking, an instance of a Multilinear Jigsaw Puzzle scheme includes a multilinear map system over groups of prime order p:
The system parameters allows a user to perform group and multilinear operations, but the parameters need not include canonical generators for the different groups g i ∈ G i and g T ∈ G T . A valid multilinear form over such system is anything that can be computed using the group operation in the separate groups and the multilinear map. (For example, for k = 3 with variables
is a valid form.) In Multilinear Jigsaw Puzzle we view group elements as the puzzle pieces. The intuitive analogy to jigsaw puzzles is that these group elements can only be combined in very structured ways -like jigsaw puzzle pieces, different puzzle pieces either "fit" together or, if they do not "fit", then they cannot be combined in any meaningful way. We view a valid multilinear form in these elements as a suggested solution to this jigsaw puzzle: a valid multilinear form suggests ways to interlock the pieces together. A solution is correct if evaluating the multilinear form on the given elements yields the the unit in the target group g 0 T ∈ G T . Thus, a Multilinear Jigsaw Puzzle scheme consists of just two algorithms, the Jigsaw generator that generates the system parameters and some group elements, and the Jigsaw verifier that checks whether a given solution is correct for these elements. In more detail, the Jigsaw generator outputs some system parameters prms and k + 1 nonempty sets of elements S i = {x
The Jigsaw verifier takes as input (prms, S 1 , . . . , S k , S T , Π), where Π and is a valid multilinear form in these elements, and it outputs "yes" if Π evaluates to the unit element in G T on the given elements and "no" otherwise. Note that the Multilinear Jigsaw Puzzle scheme itself does not specify which particular multilinear form the Jigsaw Verifier should apply, this choice will typically come from the application.
The hardness assumptions that we make typically say that two output distributions of the Jigsaw generator are computationally indistinguishable. For instance, an (asymmetric) analog of the BDDH assumption for k = 2 could be that
IV. HOW TO USE INDISTINGUISHABILITY OBFUSCATION
Now that we have constructed an indistinguishability obfuscator, we are faced with the question: what good is an indistinguishability obfuscator? The definition of indistinguishability obfuscation does not make clear what, if anything, an indistinguishability obfuscator actually hides about a circuit. In particular, if the circuit being obfuscated was already in an obvious canonical form, then we know that the indistinguishability obfuscator would not need to hide anything. We observe here an analogy to witness indistinguishable proofs [31] : if a statement being proven only has a unique witness, then a witness-indistinguishable proof does not need to hide the witness. The way witness indistinguishability can be used is by explicitly constructing statements that can have multiple witnesses. Similarly, we will use indistinguishability obfuscation by constructing circuits that inherently have multiple equivalent forms. We use this analogy to build our main application of functional encryption. Warmup: Witness Encryption for NP.
As a warmup to see how indistinguishability obfuscation can be applied, we start by considering a cryptographic notion which implicitly already considers circuits that inherently have multiple equivalent forms. Recall the notion of Witness Encryption for NP recently introduced in [18] : Given an NP Language L, a witness encryption scheme for L is an encryption scheme that takes as input an instance x and a message bit b, and outputs a ciphertext c. If x ∈ L and w is a valid witness for x, then a decryptor can use w to decrypt c and recover b. However, if x / ∈ L, then an encryption of 0 should be computationally indistinguishable from an encryption of 1.
We now observe that Indistinguishability Obfuscation for NC 1 1 to obtain indistinguishability obfuscation for all polynomial-size circuits. The main idea is to adapt the two-key paradigm [27] to work using indistinguishability obfuscators instead of witnessindistinguishable proofs. This construction is described in the full-version [30] .
To obfuscate a circuit C, we choose and publish two FHE keys PK 0 and PK 1 . We also give out encryptions of the circuit C under both FHE public keys, yielding ciphertexts c 0 and c 1 . Finally, the obfuscation also has the indistinguishability obfuscation of a certain NC 1 circuit C Dec0 that we will describe below.
The evaluator, who holds an input x, is told to use the FHE evaluation algorithm with x and both ciphertexts c 0 and c 1 to yield encryptions of C(x) under both PK 0 and PK 1 : let us call these encryptions e 0 and e 1 respectively. The evaluator also keeps track of all the intermediate bit values encountered during evaluation, which can be seen as a "proof" π that it used x to perform the evaluation correctly on both c 0 and c 1 . The evaluator then feeds e 0 , e 1 , x, π into the obfuscated circuit iO(C Dec0 ). This circuit C Dec1 first checks the proof π to make sure that e 0 and e 1 were correctly computed -note that this can be done easily in NC 1 since the evaluator has included all intermediate bit values encountered during evaluation, so the circuit merely needs to check that each appropriate triple of intermediate bit values respects the AND, OR, or NAND operations that were used during the evaluation process. If the proof checks out, then the circuit decrypts e 0 using SK 0 , and outputs this decryption, which should be C(x).
The key insight is that there is another NC 1 circuit C Dec1 that is equivalent to C Dec0 , which simply decrypts e 1 using SK 1 instead. Because of the proof π that must be provided, both of these circuits always behave identically on all inputs. Furthermore, when using C Dec0 , we note that SK 1 is never used anywhere, and therefore the semantic security of the FHE scheme using PK 1 is maintained even given C Dec0 . Thus, by alternatively applying the semantic security of the FHE scheme and switching back and forth between C Dec0 and C Dec1 using the indistinguishability obfuscation property, we can prove that the obfuscation of any two equivalent circuits C and C are computationally indistinguishable.
VI. FUNCTIONAL ENCRYPTION FOR ALL CIRCUITS
We next sketch our main application of building functional encryption for all circuits. This construction is described in the full-version [30] . The starting point idea for our solution is to pick a standard public-key encryption key pair (PK, SK) in the setup phase of the Functional Encryption. An encryption of a value x will simply be an encryption of x using the public key PK. The secret key sk C corresponding to a circuit C be an obfuscation of a program that uses SK to decrypt x, then computes and output C(x). While this solution would work if our obfuscator achieved the blackbox obfuscation definition, there is no reason to believe that an indistinguishability obfuscator would necessarily hide SK.
Recall that the indistinguishability security definition for functional encryption requires the adversary to declare two inputs x 0 and x 1 , with the promise that all secret keys SK C that she will ask for will satisfy C(x 0 ) = C(x 1 ). Then the security definition requires that the adversary will not be able to distinguish an encryption of x 0 from an encryption of x 1 .
A natural first step would be to have two public keys PK 0 and PK 1 , and require the encryption of x to consist of encryptions of x under both keys. However, in this case, unlike above, the receiver cannot generate a proof on his own that both ciphertexts encrypt the same message to provide to the obfuscated decryption circuit. Thus, we must require the encryptor to generate such a proof, which must hide x. A natural solution is to have the encryptor generate a noninteractive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof that the ciphertexts both encrypt the same input. The obfuscated circuit would first check this proof, and if it checks out, it would use one of the two secret keys SK 0 or SK 1 for decryption and evaluation, confident that the output would be the same no matter which secret key it uses. When we are proving that the adversary cannot distinguish an encryption of x 0 from an encryption of x 1 , we could move to an intermediate hybrid experiment where the NIZK proof is simulated, and the two ciphertexts are actually to x 0 and x 1 respectively.
Here we encounter the key new problem that we must tackle: when simulating a NIZK proof, we need to change the common reference string, and in all known NIZK systems, with respect to a simulated common reference string, valid proofs of false statements exist. Even with the notion of simulation soundness [28] , which was devised precisely to deal with this problem, valid proofs of false statements exist, even if they cannot be found by efficient adversaries.
However, the notion of indistinguishability obfuscation requires that circuits be equivalent for all inputs, even inputs to the circuit that contain valid proofs for false statements. We address this problem by introducing the notion of statistically simulation sound NIZK, which requires that except with respect to one particular statement to be simulated, all other valid proofs that exist must be only for true statements 1 . Statistical simulation soundness can be achieved in a standard way using witness indistinguishable proofs. Once we have it, then a similar two-key alternation argument to the one given above allows us to establish security of our functional encryption scheme. We note that full collusionresistance follows from a standard hybrid argument using the indistinguishability obfuscation definition for each secret key given out, one at a time.
Once we achieve indistinguishability security for functional encryption, this can be upgraded to natural simulationbased definitions of security using the work of De Caro et al. [29] . Furthermore, we note that our construction enjoys the property that ciphertexts are succinct; indeed their size depends only on the public-key encryption scheme and NIZK being used, and does not depend on the underlying details of the obfuscation mechanism in any way (and therefore it does not depend on the parameters needed for our Multilinear Jigsaw Puzzles). We also place no a-priori bound on the circuit size of the circuits used for secret key generation.
A. Ciphertext Succinctness and Applications
One thing we emphasize is that ciphertexts in our scheme are very succinct in that their size depends only upon the message size and security parameter. In fact, if the right combination of public key encryption and NIZK is used the ciphertext size and encryption time can be considered small in a practical sense. Prior solutions for (the weaker) primitives of ABE for circuits [16] , [17] and single use functional encryption [33] achieved ciphertexts sizes and encryption times that were proportional to the maximum depth of the function to be evaluated. (It should be noted that these solutions rely on weaker assumptions.) Following Parno et. al. [34] we get a delegatable computation scheme with where the client's work is independent of the circuit size. Following Goldwasser et. al. [33] we get a reusable Yao garbled circuits where the work to reuse a garbled circuit is proportional to the input size and independent of the size and depth of the circuit.
Finally, we get an efficient Private Linear Broadcast Encryption (PLBE) scheme as described by Boneh, Sahai, and Waters [35] , which they show implies a secure traitor tracing [36] system. This final application requires collusion resistance.
VII. AN APPLICATION TO RESTRICTED-USE SOFTWARE
We have already given evidence that indistinguishability obfuscation has significant applications to cryptography. Here, we discuss an application of indistinguishability obfuscation to a question that does not deal with encryption or authentication, but rather restricted-use software:
Software developers will often want to release a demo or restricted use version of their software that limits the features that are available in a full version. In some cases a commercial software developer will do this to demonstrate their product; in other cases the developer will want to make multiple tiers of a product with different price points. In other domains, the software might be given to a partner that is only partially trusted and the developer only wants to release the features needed for the task.
Ideally, a developer could create a downgraded version of software simply by starting with the full version and then turning off certain features at the interface level -requiring minimal additional effort. However, if this is all that is done, it could be easy for an attacker to bypass these controls and gain access to the full version or the code behind it. The other alternative is for a software development team to carefully excise all unused functionality from the core of the software. Removing functionality can become a very time consuming task that could itself lead to the introduction of software bugs. In addition, in many applications it might be unclear what can and cannot remain for a restricted use version.
One immediate solution is for a developer to restrict the use at the interface level and then release an obfuscated version of the program. For this application indistinguishability obfuscation suffices, since by definition a version restricted in the interface is indistinguishable from an obfuscated program with equivalent behavior that has its smarts removed at the start.
VIII. STRONGER NOTIONS OF OBFUSCATION
In this work, we give new constructions for secure obfuscation. While indistinguishability obfuscation is the technical focus of our work, we note that we know of no actual attacks on our obfuscation scheme as a black-box obfuscator except for the attacks that arise on specific circuit classes that are known to be unobfuscatable. This leads to the intriguing possibility that our construction (or future alternative constructions) could achieve black-box obfuscation for a large class of circuits, that somehow exclude the problematic examples that have been identified. Indeed, as observed by Goldwasser and Rothblum [3] , indistinguishability obfuscation must yield virtual black-box obfuscation if such a virtual black-box obfuscation is possible for the function being obfuscated. In particular, while much study still needs to be done, we currently have no reason not to conjecture that our obfuscation mechanism suffices for such applications as:
• Secure Patching of Software: If a new malware vulnerability is found in software, there is a risk that releasing a software patch will allow attackers to become aware of a vulnerability before the patch has a chance to fully circulate among users. Obfuscation offers a solution concept: an initial patch can be released in obfuscated form, and then transitioned to a more efficient un-obfuscated patch once large-scale adoption has occurred for the initial patch. Here, the assumption would be that the obfuscated patch would hide where the vulnerability in the software was (at least as well as the original vulnerable software did).
• "Intellectual Property" Protection: If a new algorithm is developed for solving a problem, and there is a worry that available legal protections will not suffice for preventing reverse-engineering the algorithm, then obfuscation offers a natural solution: Here, the general required security property seems very close to blackbox obfuscation, but if only certain parts of the algorithm is novel, weaker yet sufficient obfuscation security guarantees may be formalizable in some contexts.
IX. FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN OBFUSCATION
Our work opens up several new possibilities in obfuscation, below we discuss some of them.
• The Power of Indistinguishability Obfuscation:
While a black box obfuscator immediately results in several turnkey applications, our work shows that indistinguishability obfuscation combined with adroit use of other cryptographic primitives can give rise to powerful functionalities. Seeing that indistinguishability obfuscation can be much more powerful than it initially appears, an important line of research is to see how far we can push the limits of what it gives us. • Indistinguishability Obfuscation from Weaker Assumptions: The argument of security candidate for Indistinguishability Obfuscation clearly has a significant heuristic component. In future research, we can hope to gain better understanding of these heuristics and eventually achieve constructions under more standard assumptions. A major open problem is to obtain an unconditional proof for our scheme (or a variant of it) in a less idealized generic model, such as the (plain) generic multilinear map model, as opposed to the generic colored matrix model that we use. The eventual goal of this line of research may be to get an Indistinguishability Obfuscator provably secure under the Learning with Error (LWE) assumption (with the aid of complexity leveraging), perhaps using techniques similar to those developed in the context of FHE.
• Studying the Possibility of Black Box Obfuscation:
As mentioned earlier we know of no actual attacks on our obfuscation scheme as a black-box obfuscator except for attacks that arise on specific circuit classes that are known to be unobfuscatable. A clear line of research is to better understand the potential for our construction to serve as a black box obfuscator, by identifying amenable function classes. One thrust is cryptanalysis, namely finding non-generic attacks when using our scheme, perhaps even against "natural" functionalities. A second direction is to attempt to gain some evidence of the viability for black box security of our construction in some heuristic model such as the generic group model. Of course, such a study would not be limited to our construction and we expect that other interesting candidates or variants of our construction would emerge in the near future.
• Improving the Practical Efficiency: While our current obfuscation construction runs in polynomial-time, it is likely too inefficient for most practical problems. An important objective is to improve the efficiency for use in practical applications.
• Reasoning about Obfuscation of Learnable Programs in Practice: A final important task is to begin to close the gap between the theoretical definitions for obfuscation and informal expectations that often arise in practice. Large software development projects can consume millions of dollars and hundreds of person years. A company that invested such an effort might reasonably expect that a "good" obfuscator would provide some real and tangible protection. For example, the company might hope that releasing an obfuscated version of their software would not be any "worse than" providing remote access to a server running the software. One issue is that despite the substantial investment, the obfuscated program may be learnable in that its behavior can be completely determined by a (large) polynomial number of input queries. If this is the case, then simply giving out the program in the clear would technically count as valid obfuscation from the cryptographic definition even though this strategy would be very disappointing in a real sense. We would like to be able to bridge this gap between theory and practice and figure out ways to rigorously define and argue about meaningful obfuscation notions for learnable programs. Getting a better understanding of this gap appears critical for using obfuscation in noncryptographic applications. We emphasize that an important initial step is to simply understand this problem better.
X. OTHER RELATED WORK
Some recent work has focused on a collusion-bounded form of functional encryption [37] , [38] , [33] , where security is only ensured so long as an attacker does not acquire more than some predetermined number of keys. This concept is very similar to the manner in which onetime signatures relax the general notion of signatures. In these settings, collusion-bounded FE has been achieved for general circuits [37] , [38] , and in the case of single-key FE this has been done with quite succinct ciphertexts [33] . Certain collusion-bounded functional encryption schemes with special properties suffice for several interesting applications such as delegated computation and most notably reusable garbled circuits [33] . However, in the general use scenario envisioned for FE [9] , unbounded collusion resistance is essential, as a single user or a collection of users would be holding multiple secret keys. This is the focus of our work.
Recent work demonstrated that certain strong simulationbased formulations of the goal of functional encryption are impossible to meet [9] , [39] . Our work focuses on realizing the indistinguishability based definition of FE, however recent work has shows that indistinguishability security for general circuits can be used to achieve meaningful simulation-based security as well [29] .
XI. INTUITION: INDISTINGUISHABILITY OBFUSCATION CANDIDATE FOR NC

1
To help explain the role of the different components in our cryptosystem, we describe below a trajectory that begins with Kilian's protocol for oblivious NC 1 circuit evaluation, and modifying it until we end up with our obfuscation candidate for NC 1 circuits.
Starting Point: Barrington and Kilian. Barrington's theorem [40] that bounded-width branching programs can compute NC 1 circuits played a major role in cryptography [41] , [42] , [43] , providing a simple algebraic structure that facilitates structure-preserving randomization (as well as simple and natural defenses to standard attacks). In a nutshell, Barrington showed how to transform an arbitrary fan-in-2, depth-d boolean circuit C : {0, 1} → {0, 1} into a "width-5 permutation branching program" BP of Let us recall Kilian's protocol [42] in which the two players, Alice and Bob, evaluate an NC 1 circuit on their joint input. Let C(x, y) denote that circuit, with Alice's input x and Bob's input y, and |x| + |y| = . Invoking Barrington's theorem, we get a length-n branching program BP that computes the same function as C. Alice begins the protocol by choosing n random invertible matrices
over Z p , computing their inverses, and then settingÃ i,b Scheme number one: Kilian's protocol as-is. Starting our journey from Kilian to iO, we think of Alice as the obfuscator and Bob as the evaluator. The randomized branching program RBP for a universal circuit C(x, y) in NC 1 is generated during system startup. The x input corresponds to the specific circuit being obfuscated and y the input on which it is evaluated. The obfuscation consists of the matrices corresponding to her input x, {Ã i,χ inp(i) : i ∈ [n], inp(i) ≤ |x|} and all the matrixes for the inputs corresponding to y,
Bob during evaluation chooses the matrices corresponding to his input y, putting together with the matrices corresponding to input x, evaluates the program outputting C(x, y).
Unsurprisingly, this scheme is broken. Informally speaking, however, we can prove that all attacks on this basic scheme fall into three categories:
• Partial Evaluation Attacks. A partial evaluation attack occurs when the adversary computes "partial" products
and
to two inputs χ = (x, y) and χ = (x, y ), and compares these against each other. Note that the outer randomization matrices R i−1 and R −1 j will be the same. This would allow the adversary to learn whether two partial computations in the branching program yield the same value, revealing information about the input x.
• Mixed Input Attacks. A mixed input attack occurs when the adversary performs the matrix product involved in a correct computation, but doesn't respect the inp function. That is, for different steps in the BP that consider the same input bit y i , it uses some matrices that correspond to y i = 0 and others that correspond to y i = 1. Again, this could yield information about x beyond just the final output C(x, y).
• Attacks that do not respect algebraic structure or are not multilinear. These attacks must either fail to respect the algebraic structure of the matrices over Z p , or compute non-multilinear algebraic functions over these matrices 3 . Informally speaking, we prove (in a particular idealized generic model), that all multilinear attacks over matrices must fall into one of the two attack categories above.
Dealing with "other attacks" using Multilinear Jigsaw Puzzles. We begin by addressing the possibility of nonmultilinear attacks, i.e., attacks that do things other than evaluating multilinear forms on the given elements. This is precisely where Multilinear Jigsaw Puzzles come in. In our case the Jigsaw Generator will be the obfuscator, the Jigsaw Specifier will give us the plaintext matrices as above, and the Jigsaw Verifier will be used when evaluating the program in order to decide if the resulting matrix is the identity or not. Informally speaking, the Jigsaw Generator will generate a puzzle system with multi-linearity n, where n is the length of the branching program to be obfuscated. Instead of revealing the matricesÃ i,b in cleartext, the obfuscator encodes each entry of the ith matricesÃ i,b relative to the singleton index set {i} ⊆ [n]. 4 Intuitively, this encoding makes it difficult to mount attacks that are not multilinear in the input elements. Roughly speaking, our hardness assumption states that it is infeasible to distinguish the encoding of two equal-length sequences of matrices that have the same behavior in terms of their products.
Dealing with Partial Evaluation Attacks: "Bookends" and Higher Dimensional Matrices. Note that encoding the matrices in the Multilinear Jigsaw Puzzle framework does nothing to prevent Partial Evaluation Attack and Mixed Input Attacks, as those attacks arise even when the adversary respects the matrix product structure.
To address the partial evaluation attack, we would like to add special "bookend" components at the start and end of the computation, without which no partial computation can be compared to any other. To do this, first we embed the matrices A i,b inside higher-dimension matrices of the form
where the $'s are random coefficients on main diagonal that are unique to each matrix, the unspecified entries are 0, and the R i 's are random matrices over Z p (which will be invertible with overwhelming probability). Intuitively, encoding the matricesD i,b relative to the singleton insex set {i} allows us to evaluate the multilinear form corresponding to their product, thereby recovering an encoding of the matrix R 0 · P · R −1 n (with P the product matrix) relative to the index set [n] . But now P is a highdimension matrix with random random entries along the main diagonal, and the output of the function is encoded in the P 's lower-right 5×5 quadrant (depending on whether or not it is the identity matrix). How can we "decode" the final output? To accomplish this, we add the special "bookend" terms that exactly cancel out the random diagonal entries.
Specifically, let the random part of the main diagonal have dimension 2m (for m to be specified shortly), so the matrices all have dimension 2m+5. We generate two (2m+5)-vectors s and t of the form:
where the first 2 blocks of each vector have size m, and the last blocks have size 5. We also computes = sR
Increasing the multilinearity level from n to n + 2, the obfuscator adds encodings of the two bookend vectorsŝ = Enc {1} (s) andt = Enc {n+2} (t) (where Enc {i} (·) denotes an encoding relative to the singleton {i}), and also adds to the obfuscation an encoding of the scalar p * = s * , t * at level [n + 2]. Now the evaluator can compute a level-[n + 2] encoding of
where the first 2m dimensions disappear due to the special structure of the s, t and P . If A is indeed the identity matrix, then s * · A · t * T = s * , t * = p * , and so p = 0 which can be verified using the Jigsaw Verifier. If A is some other permutation matrix, equality will not hold with high probability.
Dealing with Mixed Input Attacks: Multiplicative Bundling. Finally, we must add a method that prevents the adversary from computing "mixed up" products of some matrices that correspond to y i = 0 and other that correspond to some y i = 1 (for the same input bit y i ). To defend against this threat we use a multiplicative bundling technique. The idea is simple, to prevent mixing and matching of components, Alice adds additional scalar multiples that help ensure that every "non-faithful" execution leads to a "garbled" output. Namely we choose scalars {α i,b : i ∈ [n], b ∈ {0, 1}} at random and set
i . Unfortunately with these multiplicative factors, the encoded value of p * is no longer sufficient to decode the output. To fix this issue, we need to provide in the public parameters something else that helps us to "cancel out" the α i,b 's. For that purpose, we introduce a "parallel" dummy branching program that computes the constant 1 function into our obfuscated program, and decoding the result is done by comparing the results from both programs.
Specifically, at system setup time we also generate a second set of matrices R i , vectors s and t with the same form as s and t where s , t = s, t , and choose scalars {α i,b : i ∈ [n], b ∈ {0, 1}} whose product match that of the α's, namely Observe that these random scalars indeed thwart mixedevaluation attacks: For every input bit y j , if we choose all the α i,0 's and all the α i,0 's for inp(i) = j then the product matches and we could get δ = 0 (similarly if we choose all the α i,1 's and α i,1 's). However any attempt to mix-andmatch these matrices will result in two different random products for the primary and dummy programs, which an adversary can only "cancel out" with probability 1/p. Additional Safeguards. In the construction above we choose to set the number m of "random dimensions" that are added to the matrices to more than the multi-linearity level of the system, namely set m = 2n + 5. We note that we do not have any concrete reason why even setting m = 1 is insecure, but we increase m as an additional safeguard against unanticipated attacks. By doing so, we increase the level of randomness present in both the D i,b matrices, and the individual R i matrices to be well beyond the maximum multilinearity supported by the Multilinear Jigsaw Puzzle. In particular, this means that written as formal polynomials, each entry of R −1 i is a polynomial with a degree exceeding the maximum multilinearity of the system. Intuitively, this gives us more confidence in our assumption because it seems quite implausible that an adversary that is essentially limited to computations that are "close" to multilinear forms would be able to detangle such high degree computations involving so many degrees of freedom in terms of the randomness used. However, again, we are not aware of any attacks on our scheme even without this additional safeguard.
